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David Luban

Human Dignity, Humiliation, and Torture*

ABSTRACT. Modern human rights instruments ground human rights in the concept of human dignity, without providing an underlying theory of human dignity.
This paper examines the central importance of human dignity, understood as not
humiliating people, in traditional Jewish ethics. It employs this conception of human dignity to examine and criticize U.S. use of humiliation tactics and torture
in the interrogation of terrorism suspects.

T

his paper originated as a lecture on Jewish ethics, in a series honoring the late philosopher Isaac Franck. My own writing has been
almost entirely secular, and I am not a scholar of Jewish philosophy.
Nevertheless, I have come to realize from the smatterings of Jewish law
I have studied that my approach to many issues is very close in spirit to
some central themes in Jewish ethics. This is specifically true of one of my
themes in the present paper, the central ethical importance of respecting
human dignity by not humiliating people—a theme, as I hope to show,
that similarly occupies pride of place in rabbinic ethics. The particular
context for my argument is a subject of surpassing current importance:
the torture and degradation of detainees by the United States government
in the “war on terror.”
ROOSEVELT’S TEA PARTY

I begin with a famous story, almost a parable, about the drafting of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948)—the first and
most influential document for the contemporary human rights movement
worldwide.

* This article is based on the 2008 Isaac Franck Memorial Lecture, Georgetown University,
Washington, DC. I have retained some of the spoken style of the lecture in this paper.
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal Vol. 19, No. 3, 211–230 © 2009 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

[ 211 ]

kennedy institute of ethics journal • september 2009

Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the U.N. committee charged with producing the UDHR, but the intellectual heavy lifting came from four other
remarkable committee members: Rene Cassin, a French-Jewish jurist;
John Humphrey, a Canadian lawyer; and two philosophy professors, P.
C. Chang from China and Charles Malik, a Lebanese Christian.
Shortly after the process began, Eleanor Roosevelt hosted a tea party in
her New York apartment, attended by Chang, Malik, and Humphrey. As
she reports in her diary, Chang and Malik launched into a vigorous debate
about the philosophical foundations of human rights. Chang favored a
pluralist approach, while Malik took a more absolutist stance. Soon, the
debate turned into a deep discussion of Aquinas and Confucius—and
Roosevelt admits that by that point she was completely lost, and contented
herself with refilling the teacups.
What Roosevelt discreetly left unsaid was how vividly the tea party
demonstrated to her the importance of not getting bogged down in philosophical debates about human rights. As a politically wise humanitarian,
Roosevelt understood that all would be lost if the delegates had to figure
out who actually gets it right, Aquinas or Confucius—or Kant, or Dewey,
or Marx.
Interestingly, a special UNESCO commission charged with canvassing
philosophical ideas about human rights from all over the world reached a
similar conclusion. Jacques Maritain, who belonged to this commission,
wrote that everyone agreed about the most important human rights—
provided that nobody asked them why.1
The legal scholar Cass Sunstein (1995) has coined the phrase “incompletely theorized agreements” to describe the kind of agreement that
Roosevelt thought the UDHR had to be. As Larry Solum (2008) puts
the conception, “When you cannot reach agreement at the deep end of
the pool of ideas, head for the shallow end!” And, above all, head off
the deep thinkers at the pass before they insist on actually getting to the
bottom of things.
The issue arose one more time in the UDHR negotiations, when several
Latin American delegates proposed inserting a reference to God in the
Declaration’s preamble. The majority of delegates quickly scuttled the
proposal, which they were certain would simply divide nations against
each other on religious grounds and make agreement impossible. Instead,
the UDHR rests the idea of human rights on a different foundation: human
dignity. Other human rights documents, like the United Nations Charter
(1945) and the Charter of Human Rights of the European Union (2000),
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also invoke human dignity as the core value human rights are supposed
to protect. And the Helsinki Accords (1975) make an even stronger claim:
human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”
However, it should be clear from this sketchy history that in the UDHR
and its successor instruments, the term “human dignity” is really a kind of
placeholder—an uncontroversial, neutral-sounding term for the unknown
‘X’ that anchors human rights. Of course, “human dignity” is not entirely
a culturally-neutral term that speaks in the same way to every tradition.
The phrase “human dignity” has Stoic origins (in Cicero’s De Officiis,
I.30), and the concept plays a prominent role in Christianity. Philosophically, the notion that human beings have a dignity, not merely a price, is
central to Kant’s conception of rational beings as ends in themselves. It is
a preeminently European term.
European or not, it did the job that Eleanor Roosevelt hoped it would:
the Universal Declaration passed the U.N.’s General Assembly with no
negative votes. And it may well be that this happened in part because
“human dignity” means whatever you want it to mean, which is another
way of saying that it doesn’t mean very much.
To borrow a phrase from John Rawls, the world’s nations have reached
an overlapping consensus on the central importance of human dignity,
in which each culture and subculture may tell its own story about what
human dignity is and where it comes from. In Rawls’s terminology, each
has a “comprehensive doctrine” that explains human dignity (Rawls 1999,
pp. 480–81). In a situation of overlapping consensus, the comprehensive
doctrines disappear from view, and only the shared concept remains in
the intersection of all those doctrines.
The advantage of incomplete theorization and overlapping consensus are
obvious—they make agreement possible. But the disadvantage is equally
obvious: once a concept has been whittled down to a mere placeholder,
it does no work in helping you resolve contested questions about human
rights.
One approach to this difficulty is to say “Damn the incomplete theorization, full speed ahead!” As philosophers, we should ignore politicians’
worries about getting everyone to sign on the dotted line, and forge ahead
toward the intellectual showdown that Roosevelt was so eager to avoid.
Let’s work out an analysis of human dignity from first principles, and jettison any comprehensive doctrines that get the wrong answer.
I am skeptical of this bold metaphysical approach, because I suspect
that any first principles strong enough to yield a rich concept of human
[ 213 ]

kennedy institute of ethics journal • september 2009

dignity will turn out to carry a lot of cultural freight that undermines
their claim to universality. But there is another approach, and that is to
return to the particular traditions and hear what they have to say about
human dignity. Once we do that, it may turn out that even people outside
the tradition will find its ideas attractive enough to adopt. That is the
approach I propose in this essay. I want to develop a characteristically
Jewish notion of human dignity.
I pull two main points from the texts I consider: First, that human
dignity is not a metaphysical property of individual human beings, but
rather a property of relations between human beings—between, so to
speak, the dignifier and the dignified. Second, that for the most part, respecting human dignity means something quite down to earth: it means
not humiliating people. So the theme of this part of my discussion is to
insist on the central ethical importance of nonhumiliation. My claim is
that this is a lesson close to the heart of Jewish ethics.
I then turn from these general and somewhat abstract ideas to something very concrete, very sordid, and very upsetting: the issue of torture
and so-called cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment that falls short of
torture—what lawyers abbreviate as “CID.”
It will be important to my argument that the United States, like every
other country that tortures, accompanies torture with humiliation; indeed,
that one of the defining evils of torture is the humiliation it visits on its
victims. If so, then perhaps the notion of human dignity as nonhumiliation,
so central to Jewish ethics, can help us understand why these practices
are so deeply wrong.
IN OUR IMAGE, AFTER OUR LIKENESS

For Jews, as for Christians, the central sacred text explaining human
dignity is Chapter 1, verses 26 and 27 of the Book of Genesis: “And God
said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’. . . And God
created man in his image, in the image of God He created him; male and
female He created them.” Humans have dignity because we are created
in the image of God, the imago Dei.
To a certain kind of biblical literalist, these two verses show that God
has something like a human body; and of course the Torah contains many
references to God walking, to God’s back, and finger, and face. This kind
of literalism is Maimonides’s target in the first chapter of the Guide of the
Perplexed, where he explains that the image and likeness are intellectual,
not physical. It is childish to think that God has a literal physical body
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that ours resembles; in any case, our defining property is not our physical
shape but our intellect.
But later in the Guide, Maimonides offers an even more austere argument than the rejection of God’s corporeality. God is wholly unlike
anything else, and Maimonides follows the logic of that proposition to
several surprising and perhaps unwelcome conclusions. First, the radical
dissimilarity of God and created things means that any property we ascribe
to God and to ourselves—any shared property that might form the basis
of likeness—is falsely or equivocally ascribed (Maimonides 1963, I, 56,
pp. 130–31). So the idea that our minds resemble God’s mind turns out
to be just as anthropomorphic and false as the crude belief that God has
broad shoulders and washboard abs.2
In fact, for Maimonides (1963, I, 57, pp. 132–33) no assertion about
God can be literally and unequivocally true: the very subject-predicate
form of the assertion falsely splits off God’s essence from His properties.
Eventually, Maimonides will push this argument to a drastic conclusion
and insist on a kind of ineffabilism: our talk about God can have meaning only as allegory or parable, designed to enable the only true form of
response to God, which he dramatically insists is total silence (Maimonides
1963, I, 59, p. 139).
One corollary of this view, it seems to me, is a powerful epistemological humility about God—so powerful that it thins the distinction between
religious belief and agnosticism almost to the vanishing point. After all,
if all propositions about God are false, and human knowledge comes in
propositional form, then we can know nothing about God’s properties. As
a second corollary, Maimonides rejects any form of biblical literalism. The
method of interpretation must be nonliteral interpretation, drash. Taken
together, epistemological modesty and anti-literalism powerfully open up
a space for rationalist reflection on sacred texts. It is a space where Jewish
ethics and secular ethics can meet and debate in a fruitful way.
What, then, should our drash be about human beings created in God’s
image and likeness? If Maimonides is right, the question “In what respect
are we like God?” is simply the wrong question to ask. Searching for some
metaphysical property of humans called “human dignity” is a dead end,
because it requires us to know God’s unknowable properties. All that
we really can infer from the biblical text is that a certain relationship exists between God and man—the relationship of “creating in one’s own
image”—and that human dignity lies in the fact of this relationship.
A more subtle point is this: if God creates us in his image, perhaps our
being created in God’s image entails the human ability to engage each
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other in a parallel kind of relationship—a relationship of honoring and
acknowledging the other by treating him or her as a being in my own image. A well-known midrash implicitly takes this point of view:
R. Akiva says: “Love your fellow as yourself” (Lev. 19:18), this is the greatest principle of the Torah. . . . R. Tanhuma explained: “He made him in the
likeness of God” (Gen. 5:1). (Genesis Rabba 24)

Rabbi Tanhuma explicitly connects the imago Dei, the creation of man in
God’s own image, with “Love your fellow as yourself,” the classic expression of honor for the human dignity of the other. As God creates man in
His likeness, men and women live up to that image by acknowledging
others as likenesses of themselves.
I am suggesting that instead of thinking about “human dignity” as
a metaphysical property of human beings, we should take as our basic
notion the relational property of “respecting human dignity.” In Jewish
ethics, that basic relation gets spelled out in this way: “Person X treats
Person Y as if Y is X’s likeness,” which is a pedantic way of saying: Love
your fellow as yourself.3
Think of this as the relation between the dignifier and the dignified—“the
dignifier treats the dignified as if the dignified is the dignifier’s likeness.”
Once we elaborate what this relation entails, we will have, in effect, an
implicit definition of human dignity.
This elaboration can very likely be accomplished in more than one way.
The catalogue of rights in the UDHR offers one specification of the kinds
of behaviors that acknowledge other people’s likeness to myself and how
I would wish to be treated. But the various comprehensive doctrines may
have alternative elaborations. So the next task is to discover what practices
the Jewish tradition recognizes as respecting human dignity.
THE WRONG OF HUMILIATION IN RABBINIC ETHICS

In the biblical story of Tamar, the widow Tamar sleeps with her own
father-in-law, Judah, as a prostitute, and conceives a child. Because her
face was covered, Judah has no idea that the prostitute he coupled with
was Tamar. When he learns that Tamar, the widow of his son, has become pregnant, he orders her burned to death in a fiery furnace. But as
she is being led to her execution, she asks that certain tokens Judah had
given to her when she was playing the prostitute be sent to him. Seeing
the tokens, he realizes that he is the father of her child, and spares Tamar
(Gen. 38: 6–26).
[ 216 ]

Luban • Human Dignity, Humiliation, and Torture

The Talmud focuses on one detail of this revolting story: the fact that
Tamar discreetly sent the tokens to Judah instead of announcing in public
that he was the father of her child. What impressed the rabbis was the
colossal risk she took. What if the tokens never arrived? What if Judah
didn’t recognize them? Or what if, recognizing them, Judah decided to
do nothing? Then Tamar would have died a horrible death. Tamar was
willing to run that risk rather than shame Judah in public. Rabbi Shimon
ben Yochai treats Tamar’s courage as an exemplar, and derives a moral
from the story:
“It is better that a person should cast himself into a fiery furnace than that
he should shame his fellow in public.” (Babylonian Talmud [BT], Bava
Metzia 59a)

This particular sugya belongs to an extended discussion of forms of harming others by shaming them. Drawing on various biblical proof-texts, the
rabbis come up with several equally melodramatic formulas, like this:
“If anyone makes his friend’s face turn white [from shame] in public, it is
as if he had spilled his blood.”

To which one rabbi replies, “What you are saying is right, because I have
seen how the red coloring leaves and his face turns white” (BT, Bava
Metzia 59a).
Or this: A man who sleeps with another man’s wife must be punished,
but he still has a share in the World to Come; but “one who shames his
fellow person in public has no share in the World to Come!” (BT, Bava
Metzia 59a).
Passages like these should persuade us that the nonhumiliation of others occupies a central place in Jewish ethics. Once we appreciate this, we
can find the theme in many contexts unrelated to shaming someone with
words.
Consider, for example, Maimonides’s discussion of tzedakah, alms giving, which is among the most famous passages in all rabbinics. Maimonides
is overwhelmingly concerned that tzedakah not shame the recipient. In
fact, he says straightforwardly that “Whoever gives tzedakah to a poor
man ill-manneredly . . . has lost all the merit of his action even though
he should give him a thousand gold pieces” (Maimonides 1972, Book
7, Ch. 10, §7, p. 136). Maimonides prefers giving too little money, but
graciously, to giving an adequate amount with ill grace. He ranks giving
before you are asked higher than giving after you are asked. And he praises
anonymous giving because it will not shame the recipient (Maimonides
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1972, §§7–14, pp. 136–37). Every value judgment in his discussion of the
forms of giving manifests the central concern for sparing the poor person
who receives tzedakah from humiliation.
The same concerns govern a series of Talmudic strictures requiring the
rich to avoid ostentation during communal mourning in order to avoid
shaming the poor who are also present. Wealthy people bringing gifts of
food to the house of a mourner should not bring the food on fancy platters, or serve beverages in elegant glasses, because then the poor who are
also bringing food to the house of mourning will be shamed. Because the
poor often cover the deceased’s face, which has been discolored through
hard work, the rich must cover the faces of their dead as well. And the
rich, like the poor, must be transported to their graves in plain coffins (BT,
Mo’Ed Katan 27a–27b).
All these examples, it appears, have to do with the ethical centrality of
not humiliating or shaming people. The same ethical tradition reappears in
contemporary form in Avishai Margalit’s definition of a decent society as
one whose institutions do not humiliate people (Margalit 1996, p. 1).
One question is whether not humiliating people is really the same as
honoring human dignity. Isn’t human dignity something more grandiose,
more significant, than merely not being embarrassed?
Of course it may be—and in any case, some violations of human dignity
have nothing directly to do with humiliation. But humiliating people is
certainly a central case of violating human dignity, and the rabbis who
invoked human dignity had very down-to-earth examples in mind.
Thus, Rabba asks Rabbi Hisda whether it is permissible on the Sabbath
to carry stones to the outhouse to wipe yourself. Rabbi Hisda replies: “Human dignity is very important . . . and it supersedes a negative injunction of
the Torah” (BT, Shabbat 81a–b). Two points about this example bear close
consideration. First, Rabbi Hisda uses the Hebrew equivalent of “human
dignity,” kvod ha-briot [lit., ‘the dignity of created things], for something
that is quite humble and has to do with relatively petty embarrassment.
This supports the claim I am making, which is that within the Jewish tradition respecting human dignity has as a central meaning not humiliating
people. Nonhumiliation may not exhaust the concept of human dignity,
but it strikes me as the paradigm of what respecting human dignity means.
At worst, nonhumiliation will be a useful naturalized stand-in for the more
grandiose but vaguer concept of “respecting human dignity.”
Second, the principle at work in Rabbi Hisda’s response is tremendously
significant: he says that human dignity is so important that it can over[ 218 ]
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ride the law. Subsequent interpretation of Rabbi Hisda’s dictum limits
this principle to rabbinic law, not Torah law—but even that limitation is
controversial, because the rabbis also identify some Torah laws that can
be overridden in the name of human dignity. So the principle that human
dignity can override the law actually turns out to be a very strong one.4 In
contemporary America, where lawyers in the Bush administration claimed
the right of the President to override any statute in the lawbook, including
the prohibition on torture, it is a remarkable and refreshing counterweight
to discover in the Talmud a different kind of legal override—an override
in the defense of human dignity rather than in attacks on it.
One important question about nonhumiliation is whether the wrong
in humiliating others is purely subjective and psychological. What if the
victims do not recognize that they are being humiliated? What if they
belong to a culture in which a practice that we would find humiliating
they regard as perfectly normal and natural? Is the notion of humiliation
subjective and victim-relative, or objective and universal? If it is subjective, then people who have been beaten downso long that they no longer
feel humiliated by it are not really humiliated, and their human dignity
has not really been injured.
The subjectivity of humiliation poses a very hard and very deep-cutting
challenge to the project of connecting human dignity with universal human
rights. This is not the place for a full discussion, but I shall say a few more
words about the issue. My own strong intuition is that humiliation is not
merely subjective. Let me show why through a thought experiment.
A student drinks too much at a party and passes out. Some malicious
wiseacres proceed to undress her and exhibit her naked body to everyone
at the party—friends, acquaintances, dorm-mates, and strangers. Then
they put her clothes back on, and when she wakes up and sobers up,
nobody tells her what happened. In my view, the most natural and correct thing to say is that she has been humiliated—even if she never finds
out and never has any subjective experience of humiliation. In much the
same way, I believe that cultural practices of human subordination may
be objectively humiliating, even though participants in the practice are so
used to it that it does not cause them psychological pain.5
And this nonpsychological notion of humiliation is the rabbis’ view
as well. In the same sugya that declares that using an insulting nickname
for someone in public is the moral equivalent of murder, the rabbis add:
“Even when he is accustomed to the nickname” and therefore experiences
no subjective humiliation (BT, Bava Metzia, 58b).
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TORTURE AND HUMILIATION IN THE “WAR ON TERROR”

So far, I have argued for four main propositions: First, that human
dignity is a property of human relationships, not a metaphysical fact
about human nature. Second, that the paradigm case of violating human
dignity consists in humiliating someone. Third, that humiliation is not,
or not only, a matter of subjective psychological pain for the victim. And
fourth, that all these ideas make up a central strand of Jewish ethics, at
least as I interpret the texts I have discussed.
At this point, I shall turn away from abstract questions about human
rights and human dignity and toward my principal practical topic: U.S.
practices of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in the
War on Terror.
I begin with some legal background. U.S. law on these issues derives
from two major multilateral treaties to which we are parties. The first is
the Convention Against Torture (CAT), which currently has 140 parties.
The second is the Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of wartime
captives. All the world’s 192 states belong to the Geneva Conventions.
CAT offers a legal definition of torture, which I will simplify slightly: it
is the intentional infliction of severe mental or physical pain or suffering.6
The Convention requires states to make official torture a crime, which
the United States has done. It also requires states to undertake to prevent
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment that falls short of torture, although
it does not require them to criminalize CID. In 2005, the U.S. Congress
implemented this clause of the treaty, over strenuous Bush Administration
objections, and banned CID, without criminalizing it.
The Geneva Conventions contain an article, so-called Common Article
3, which applies to al Qaeda detainees and contains similar prohibitions.
Article 3 bans torture and cruelty, and it also bans “outrages against personal dignity,” including humiliating or degrading treatment. Both treaties
therefore distinguish torture from lesser forms of cruelty, which include
humiliation and degradation, and both forbid both torture and outrages
against personal dignity.
It is no secret that U.S. lawyers worked tirelessly for more than five years
to loophole their way around these prohibitions so that the CIA can do
bad things to terrorist suspects. Several of the “torture memos” became
public in 2004, but others were hidden until the Obama administration
released them in April 2009. These additional memos provide a detailed
description of the CIA’s so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques”—
EITs—a bit of a euphemism for torture and humiliation. Through prodi[ 220 ]
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gious legal sophistry, Justice Department lawyers concluded that none of
the techniques amounts to torture, either singly or taken in combination,
and—furthermore—that none amounts to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment.7
These conclusions are staggering, given the nature of the techniques.
The best known is waterboarding: partially drowning the victim by pouring water over a cloth covering his face, interrupting the process before
he dies. Waterboarding, however, is not the only technique described in
the torture memos. In addition, the CIA used—and the Justice Department approved—techniques that are obviously humiliating and degrading. Detainees were stripped naked. They were fed for weeks on nothing
but liquid dietary supplements. They were hosed down with cold water,
grabbed and slapped in the face, and slammed into walls. They were
deprived of sleep for up to a week by being shackled upright, in diapers,
with manacles around their legs and manacles from their wrists to the
ceiling.8 The torture memos make a point of insisting that during the sleep
deprivation the victims were under observation 24 hours a day, supposedly as a safety measure to ensure that their diapers never overflowed and
their suffering never crossed the talismanic legal threshold to “severe” (in
which case it might count as torture, and the agents who performed it as
serious felons). Perhaps this really was the reason; but it cannot escape
our notice that being looked at round the clock in this degrading condition only adds to the humiliation.
Next consider the famous Abu Ghraib photographs, readily available
on the internet. They show terrified, naked detainees warding off attack
dogs with their hands; shackled to the furniture in painful stress positions
with women’s underpants over their faces; led around on dog leashes; and
standing naked in front of a leering female soldier. I trust that nobody
will deny the obvious—that the evil depicted in these photographs is the
humiliation and degradation of these detainees, the all-out assault on
their human dignity.
The U.S. government insists that these abuses were completely unauthorized. The specific instances on the Abu Ghraib night shift may well
have lacked authorization. But according to the Schmidt Report (2005),
the Army’s official report on abuses at Guantanamo, every one of the
four techniques I have just mentioned was authorized at least once at
Guantanamo, in the interrogation of “Detainee 063”—a man named
Mohammed Al Qahtani.9 In the case of threatening him with military
working dogs, the report tells us that the technique was authorized by
[ 221 ]
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SECDEF himself—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Schmidt Report
2005, p. 14). Significantly, the Abu Ghraib abuses occurred soon after the
Guantanamo commandant was sent to Iraq in order to “Gitmoize” Abu
Ghraib. These were not frat boy pranks—they were policies approved at
the highest levels of government. As for the CIA’s techniques, the Senate
Intelligence Committee reports that they were discussed and approved at
“Principals’ Meetings” attended by “the Vice President, the National Security Adviser, the Attorney General, the Acting Assistant Attorney General
for the Office of Legal Counsel, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General, the
Counsel to the President, and the Legal Adviser to the National Security
Council” (OLC Opinions 2009, p. 7; see also, Greenburg, Rosenberg,
and De Vogue 2008).
The four Guantanamo techniques I have mentioned are by no means
the only humiliations in the Abu Ghraib photos. The more lurid photos
depict naked men piled in pyramids, or smeared from head to toe in feces,
or forced to urinate in each other’s mouths. None of these tactics were
approved by the U.S. government, but it should come as no surprise that
once you have begun to dehumanize and degrade people in your control
the very idea of limits quickly disappears.
Furthermore, the four techniques were not the only humiliations visited
on Al Qahtani. Schmidt also reports that interrogators taunted him that
he was homosexual, and that other detainees knew it; they forced him to
dance with a male interrogator; they told him that his mother and sister
were whores; and a female interrogator straddled him and whispered to
him about the deaths of fellow Al Qaeda members. Female soldiers took
off their battle-dress tops and ran their hands through other detainees’
hair, whispering that resistance is futile. According to Schmidt, all these
techniques were authorized (Schmidt Report 2005, pp. 8, 16, 19).
The torture lawyers devoted their energies to showing that although
these techniques may have been deeply unpleasant, they were not “torture,” and therefore not crimes. But there is something deeply wrong, not
to mention perverse, about the entire enterprise of trying to draw fine lines
between torture and lesser abuses. An essential continuity exists between
them, because all have the degradation of their victim as their core. The
truth embodied in CAT and the Geneva Conventions is that torture and
humiliation without torture belong together as forms of abuse; the falsehood comes when we imagine that there is a sharp distinction between
them just because they are banned by different clauses of the treaties.
Indeed, a recent medical study found absolutely no difference between the
[ 222 ]
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traumatic psychological after-effects of physical torture and humiliation
(Baçoglu et al. 2007).
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TORTURE AND HUMILIATION

Why did U.S. interrogators use humiliation tactics like these? Several
reports indicate that they were briefed using a book by anthropologist
Raphael Patai called The Arab Mind, which devotes a chapter to the theme
that Arab men are sexually modest and particularly sensitive to sexual
humiliation (Mayer 2008, p. 168). And Schmidt informs us that these
were “Ego Down” and “Futility” tactics—the Army’s names for tactics
designed to break the detainees by making them feel worthless and filling
them with despair. It is hard to come up with a better description of assaulting human dignity. As I now wish to argue, in physical torture too a
central defining feature of torture is the victim’s humiliation.
Let me begin with what may seem like a peculiar question: what, specifically, characterizes the evil of torture?10
The answer may seem obvious: it’s the pain, stupid! No experience
is more horrible than severe pain; and, one might think, nothing more
needs to be said. But that is untrue. The pain of childbirth is undoubtedly
comparable to or even worse than many tortures, including severe ones.
Yet millions of women who no-one would call irrational have preferred
natural childbirth to anesthesia. The connection of birth pangs to a joyful
or even ecstatic event changes the sensations’ character without diminishing their painfulness.
In the case of torture, the connection is with terrifying and “breaking”
the victim. Fear is perhaps the most important evil-maker connected with
the pain of torture. The torture victim never knows whether his torturer
will do even worse things, regardless of any legal restrictions; the uncertainty is perpetual.
And terror itself is closely connected with humiliation, especially when
someone else sets about terrifying us. Terror makes us whimper and beg;
it makes us lose control of our bowel and bladder. The Abu Ghraib doghandlers had contests to see who could make a detainee foul himself first.
The strategic use of terror is one way that torture and humiliation are
tightly bound together. But that is not all.
The experience of acute pain is itself degrading because it collapses
our world and reduces us to mere prisoners of our bodies.11 Pain forcibly
severs our focus on anything outside of us; it shrinks our horizon to our
own body. This is degrading in itself, but when it happens in front of
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spectators, the experience is doubly shameful and humiliating. I vividly
recall a visit to some old friends when my back went out. The pain was
bad enough that for a few minutes I couldn’t move; but at the same time
I felt perfectly, miserably ashamed to be seen in this ridiculous helpless
state by my friends and family. It did not even matter that they were sympathetic; obviously, however, it would be infinitely worse if the spectator
is an enemy who inflicts the suffering and laughs at you.
Perhaps most significantly, the relation between the torturer and the
victim is one of absolute domination and absolute subordination. The
torturer, as Jean Améry remarks, “has control of the other’s scream of
pain and death; he is master over flesh and spirit, life and death.” Améry
(1980, p. 35)—who was tortured by the Gestapo—elaborates:
A slight pressure by the tool-wielding hand is enough to turn the other—
along with his head, in which are perhaps stored Kant and Hegel, and all
nine symphonies, and the World as Will and Representation —into a shrilly
squealing piglet at slaughter. When it has happened and the torturer has
expanded into the body of his fellow man and extinguished what was his
spirit, he himself can then smoke a cigarette or sit down to breakfast or, if
he has the desire, have a look in at the World as Will and Representation.

In recent years, a number of writers have followed Améry in trying
to identify what makes torture so uniquely evil. David Sussman (2005b,
pp. 25–26) locates the evil of torture in the fact “that the only thing that
matters to [the torture victim] is pleasing this other person who appears
infinitely distant, important, inscrutable, powerful, and free.”12 Henry
Shue (1978) focuses on the sheer defenselessness of the torture victim.
Louis Michael Seidman (2005, p. 907) points to the destruction of the
victim’s will. Although these diagnoses of torture’s evil have significant
points of difference, they all call attention to the degrading relational
character of torture, in addition to the pain and the fear. They leave the
victim in a state of abject humiliation. The victim counts as nothing, the
torturer as everything. Nothing could be worse, from the standpoint of
Jewish ethics, on the interpretation offered here. The denial of human
dignity is close to total.
FRAUDULENT NECESSITY

I now come to an unpleasant fact. Many people approve of torture.
A 2009 Pew poll (Pew Forum 2009) showed that about half of surveyed
Americans believe that torture against “suspected terrorists” can often or
sometimes be justified, and the number is up since a similar poll in 2005.
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Not even terrorists—merely suspected terrorists. In an earlier BBC poll
(2006) of 27,000 people in 25 countries, the United States placed ninth
in pro-torture sentiment, after China, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria,
the Philippines, and Russia, not exactly the human rights honor roll. I
am sorry to report that Israel topped the list, with 43 percent of those
surveyed favoring some torture.
Oftentimes, supporters of torture appeal to a kind of military necessity,
based on the intuition that if torture is the only way to find out where
a ticking bomb is hidden, the need to save innocent lives outweighs the
moral prohibition against torture.
I have argued elsewhere that the ticking bomb scenario is an intellectual fraud (Luban, in press; 2005). A moment’s thought will show how
many unlikely assumptions go into the scenario. You know the bomb is
out there, you know the time is short, you know you have the right captive, you know that he knows where the bomb is hidden, you can’t find
the bomb any other way, evacuating people is impossible, nothing short
of torture will make him talk, he can’t stall or mislead you for the few
hours before the bomb detonates, you know how to torture him without
accidentally killing him or making him lose consciousness—and despite
being a trained torturer you haven’t become a sadist or a sociopath. Each
of these is improbable; to suppose that all will occur together verges on
the preposterous.
And indeed, the United States government has never identified a genuine
ticking bomb scenario, even though leaking the details would have been
to the immense advantage of the Bush administration. The newly-released
torture memos assert several times that the CIA reserved its “enhanced”
techniques to situations of last resort. In fact, however, the CIA’s protocols
gave detainees only one chance to “provide information on actionable
threats and location information on High-Value Targets at large” before
beginning “enhanced” interrogation as early as the first day (Memorandum
2005b, pp. 7, 8). One of the memos notes that “it is difficult to determine
conclusively whether interrogations have provided information critical to
interdicting specific imminent attacks” (Memorandum 2005b, p. 10).
Yet we swallow the fiction of ticking bombs. The danger in the ticking
bomb conversation is that the real source of our pro-torture intuitions
is not intelligence gathering, but rage. Consciously or unconsciously, we
approve of the torture of terrorists for punitive reasons, and we deceive
ourselves into repackaging rage as rationality. We want to see him beg for
mercy; we want to humiliate.
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If so, this shows how desperately fragile the ethics of respect for human
dignity is. When the enemy, or suspected enemy, is in our hands, it is hard
to view him as our likeness. The temptation to degrade him just because
he is the enemy seems overwhelming. Yet resisting the temptation comes
close to the core of ethics as I have described it here.
NOTES

1. The story of Roosevelt’s tea party, and of the UNESCO commission and
Maritain’s comment, are both told in Mary Ann Glendon (2001).
2. “The reasons that led those who believe in the existence of attributes belonging to the Creator to this belief are akin to those that led those who
believe in the doctrine of His corporeality to that belief. . . . The people in
question have, as it were, divested God of corporeality but not of the modes
of corporeality, namely, the accidents—I mean the aptitudes of the soul, all
of which are qualities” (Maimonides 1963, I, 53, pp. 119–20). Isaac Franck
(1988), in whose honor this lecture was composed, wrote illuminatingly
about Maimonides’s “negative theology,” and its relation to Aquinas.
3. I will make no effort here to reconcile this way of thinking with Emanuel Levinas’s ethics, in which our infinite responsibility to the other is connected not
with the other’s likeness to us, but rather to the other’s radical otherness. For a
clear discussion of this point, see Hilary Putnam (2008, pp. 70–71, 80–83).
4. In this discussion, I am drawing on Rabbi Melissa Weintraub (2005).
5. My view here accords with that of Jon Elster (1985) in the title essay of Sour
Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. There, Elster defines the
notion of “adaptive preference formation,” a term that refers to unconscious
modification of one’s own preferences to accommodate low expectations of
what kind of treatment one can realistically hope for.
6. CAT limits its definition to torture carried out by government officials or
under color of governmental authority, and also to torture undertaken for
certain specific purposes, such as interrogation, punishment, intimidation,
or discrimination. For purposes of this discussion, I set these limitations to
one side.
7. The new memos are available on the Federalist Society website, by following
the links at http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.27/default.asp (accessed 22
July 2009). Elsewhere I have explained in detail why the memos are legal
sophistry (Luban 2007; 2009). (The 2009 document is written testimony,
which will appear in the Congressional Record, and is an expansion of
oral testimony delivered to the Senate Judiciary; I am happy to provide the
expanded testimony to interested readers.) Shortly before the memos were
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released, journalist Mark Danner obtained and published the International
Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC 2007) confidential report to the U.S.
government about CIA torture, based on interviews with Guantanamo detainees who had not yet had any opportunity to coordinate their stories. The
ICRC report indicates that in execution the CIA’s procedures went beyond
the techniques described in the memos.
8. Even in the ancient world, sleep deprivation was understood to be a horrible torture. Cicero (De Officiis III.xxvii.100) characterizes the execution of
Regulus by the Carthaginians through “enforced wakefulness” (vigilando)
as “exquisite torture” (exquisita supplicia).
		
The bureaucratic prose of the torture memo deserves full quotation:
“The primary method of sleep deprivation involves the use of shackling
to keep the detainee awake. In this method, the detainee is standing and is
handcuffed, and the handcuffs are attached by a length of chain to the ceiling.
The detainee’s hands are shackled in front of his body. . . .The detainee’s feet
are shackled to a bolt in the floor. . . . All of the detainee’s weight is borne
by his legs and feet during standing sleep deprivation. You have informed
us that the detainee is not allowed to hang from or support his body weight
with the shackles. . . . If the detainee is clothed, he wears an adult diaper
under his pants. Detainees subject to sleep deprivation who are also subject
to nudity as a separate interrogation technique will at times be nude and
wearing a diaper . . . . You have informed us that to date no detainee has
experienced any skin problems resulting from use of diapers. The maximum
allowable duration for sleep deprivation authorized by the CIA is 180 hours,
after which the detainee must be permitted to sleep for at least eight hours.
You have informed us that to date, more than a dozen detainees have been
subjected to sleep deprivation of more than 48 hours, and three detainees
have been subjected to sleep deprivation of more than 96 hours; the longest
period of time for which any detainee has been deprived of sleep by the CIA
is 180 hours” (Memorandum 2005a, pp. 10–13).
9. The interrogation of Qahtani is discussed in the Schmidt Report (2005, pp.
13–21). For a detailed discussion of this interrogation, see Philippe Sands
(2008).
10. The following paragraphs draw on a more extensive discussion in my paper
“Unthinking the Ticking Bomb” (Luban, in press).
11. This is one of the themes of Elaine Scarry’s powerful book The Body in Pain:
The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford University Press, 1987).
12. Sussman (2005a, pp. 227–30) offers a slightly different explanation in “Defining Torture,” where he describes the distinctive evil of torture as forced
passivity.
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